GT40 – Forebear of “The Pace Car for an Entire Company”
| 01 January 2005
Ford calls 2005 the year of the car. They announced several new vehicles including the first ever clean-sheet-of-paper Mustang. In a giant leap forward, Mustang will no longer be based on warmed over Falcons, Pintos, or Fairmonts. Ford demonstrated commitment to the marque by finally making Mustang its own car. The icon at the core of clubs like CRMC should be better than ever as it continues into the 21st century.
Another 2005 entry from Ford is called “the pace car for an entire company.” That hefty banner belongs, of course, to the Ford GT. As awesome as the new GT is, it’s the heritage of the GT that we honor this month in our “Pony of the Month” column. Thanks to James Clegg and his camera, we have an opportunity to see actual photographs of the GT40 MK.II known as XGT-3. XGT-3 is a historically significant forebear of the new GT; it’s a significant piece of Ford racing history. James took the pictures at a 1981 Solo II event held at MacIntire Air Force Base outside of Columbia, SC.
As a fully prepared factory race car, XGT-3 is the only known MK.II that was never raced as a works car. Other distinguishing characteristics include the facts that it was prepared by Alan Mann Racing with a lightweight roof and it served as the T-car for the Ford assault on Le Mans in 1966. James and I found limited additional information on XGT-3 but the process of looking for it was entertaining, it was engrossing, and it provided a great deal of insight into the GT40 story. So this month the separate columns normally assigned to “Pony of the Month” and “Pony Tricks” were combined and allocated to an article devoted to Ford racing history of the GT40 variety. What better way to begin Ford’s year of the car than to explore some historical background of “the pace car for an entire company?”
The information for this summary was developed through contacts that James has at SAAC, from a visit I had with Lee Holman of Holman Automotive (Holman-Moody), from the book Holman Moody, The Legendary Race Team by Tom Cotter and Al Pearce, and from the book GT40, An Individual History and Race Record by Ronnie Spain. We hope you enjoy reading the article as much as we enjoyed putting it together. (Ed.)
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You probably remember that Ford GT40s finished 1st, 2nd, and 3rd in the 1966 race at Le Mans, France. They beat the formidable Ferraris for the first of what would be four consecutive wins at Le Mans Circuit de la Sarth. Beginning with no more than a mandate in 1963, it was an extraordinarily difficult feat to win at Le Mans after only three attempts. But that was the essence of the GT40 story. It was a story of passion, intense focus, and amazing drive that ultimately led to racing success. And it was the story of unquestioning financial support from Ford Motor Co. because Henry Ford, II was committed to making an endurance racing statement. Perhaps more to the point, Henry, II wanted to make an endurance racing statement and embarrass Ferrari in the process. He was out to get revenge because of a failed 1963 partnership proposal between Ford and Enzo Ferrari.
The partnership proposal went like this: On the one hand, Mr. Ferrari approached Ford because he wanted to devote more time to his race cars by finding a partner to build his street cars. On the other hand through different channels and with a surreal coincidence of timing, Ford approached Ferrari to go endurance racing together. Ford’s primary focus was to showcase their name through a win at Le Mans but they didn’t want to start from scratch. Because Ferrari “owned” the Le Mans 24-hour race with consecutive wins in 1960, ‘61, ‘62, and ’63, Ford thought partnership would be an excellent way to “buy” the racing talent needed to achieve their goal. It appeared that each had what the other wanted so talks were opened. Unfortunately, Ford’s corporate business approach (lawyers, auditors, nitpickers) overwhelmed Mr. Ferrari and he called the deal off. That’s the move that incensed Henry, II and caused him to commit to a racing program on Ford’s own tab. The goals would be to win at Le Mans and to run the Ferraris into the ground, no matter what it took. Ford would develop and build their own race cars, call them Ford GT, power them with the Ford 256 cid V-8 Indy racing engines, and they would go Ferrari hunting.
To begin pursuit of the goal, Ford established a dedicated unit named Special Vehicle Operations (SVO), which would later be renamed Ford Advanced Vehicles (FAV). Located west of London at Slough and fully financed by Ford, SVO had nearly complete autonomy to allow them to go about their work without the red tape typically associated with corporate oversight. Ford engineer Roy Lunn was assigned to lead the operation. Mr. Lunn was a UK native who had worked at Ford of England before he was transferred to Dearborn in 1958. While in Dearborn, one of his responsibilities was to lead development of a 1962 prototype known as Mustang I, yes that Mustang I. To Mr. Lunn, the SVO mandate was clear: develop a race car that could crush the Ferraris at Le Mans.
Ford Indy Race Engine
The 256 cid Indy racing engine was an aluminum version of the 1963 Fairlane pushrod 221/260 cid small block V-8 series. It used the standard 2.87 inch stroke but it was sleeved to 256 cid. It was fueled by pump gasoline and it was the engine that, in 1963 installed in the rear of a Lotus 29, spelled the beginning of the end for the Offenhauser powered front-engined USAC Roadsters.
When Roy Lunn went shopping for talented individuals to design and build the GT, Colin Chapman (Lotus) and Eric Broadley (Lola) were high on his list of candidates to design the car; Eric Broadley was finally selected and placed on contract. John Wyer was hired as another important member of the organization. Wyer would run the race team because of his success as Aston-Martin’s team manager in 1959 when Aston-Martin DBR1/300 machines finished 1st and 2nd at Le Mans ahead of Ferraris in positions three through six. The idea was to base the GT on Eric Broadley’s Lola technology and with John Wyer’s insight become competitive early on. Abbey Panels of Coventry was contracted to build tubs for the car. The operation at Slough would purchase the tubs from Abbey Panels and serialize them in the series P/10xx as part of the build process.
By April 1964, the SVO group had developed a prototype and received approval to proceed with the race cars. The first cars were built and one of them was prepared for an initial outing at the Nürburgring three weeks before the June 1964 race at Le Mans. Phil Hill and Bruce McLaren drove the car but it dnf’d because rear suspension attaching points began to fail after only 15 laps. And so it went for the balance of 1964. If the cars didn’t crash, they broke. Three cars dnf’d at Le Mans while Ferrari celebrated its fifth straight win, three dnf’d at Reims, and three at Nassau.
Despite ongoing modifications and upgrades to suspension, engines, transmissions, clutches, rear ends, etc., etc., etc., not a single GT finished any of the 1964 races, giving Ford a 100% failure rate for the year. It was a huge disappointment; but in retrospect it was probably unrealistic to expect much success during the first season. Endurance racing is a tough game and in 1964, FAV never found the winning combination. The cars had speed when they were running but they were never running on the last lap.
Consequently, Roy Lunn knew Ford expected big changes for 1965. Pressured by Ford Corporate, he moved to contract with Carroll Shelby of Shelby American, Inc. (SAI) to run the racing operation thus freeing John Wyer to build cars at FAV when Eric Broadley’s contract expired and he returned to Lola. Ford wanted Shelby because of his success in USRRC and FIA using Ford engines in the open AC Ace-based Cobra and its closed sibling, the Cobra Daytona Coupe designed by Pete Brock. And they also wanted Shelby because his band of misfits had a reputation bordering on genius when it came to taking existing parts and bolting them together to make competitive race cars that were nearly bulletproof. Along with Shelby came the irascible Ken Miles as in-house test driver. Talented drivers such as Jo Schlesser, Bruce McLaren, and Roy Salvadori handled testing in 1964 but they weren’t in-house drivers. Having the highly talented Miles as an in-house member of the development team was a tremendous asset.
In addition to the Shelby contract, Ford set up in Dearborn another autonomous operation called Kar Kraft. Kar Kraft would have access to the Ford wind tunnel and it would assist with development as a domestic mirror of FAV. Abbey Panels would continue to supply the tubs and FAV would continue to purchase them and serialize them.
Using the cars that had failed to finish Nassau the previous December and with Miles behind the wheel, SAI began testing immediately and systematically at Riverside, CA. SAI first improved the suspension and handling and then moved systematically through the cars. After each change, Miles, with his bull dog approach, would test drive at the limit until something broke. A fix for that problem would be implemented and then Miles would go at it again until something else broke. Repeat, repeat, repeat to an exhausting conclusion. When Miles sorted a car, it was well known that he would find most, if not all, of the design weaknesses.
Shelby replaced the 256-cid engines with 289s and the transmissions were strengthened. In the Dearborn wind tunnel, the cars were tuned for aerodynamic stability and better ducting of cooling air to the machinery. The 1964 cars had been aerodynamically unstable with a tendency to unload the rear wheels at high speed. An add-on rear deck spoiler had helped to correct aerodynamic lift but the Dearborn wind tunnel provided an opportunity to design a fully engineered fix.
At the end of February 1965, the new race season began with two Ford GTs running in the Daytona Continental. They both finished the race, which was a major accomplishment compared to 1964. In fact, they not only finished, they placed 1st and 3rd. An enormous corner had been turned and it was hoped that success would continue through the early part of the season to help build momentum as FAV and SAI fine tuned for Le Mans in mid June. So it was on to Sebring where the results were a 2nd and a crash, Monza with a 3rd and a crash, and the Nürburgring with an 8th and two dnf. Next up was Le Mans.
Five cars, now called GT40, (redesignated from GT to GT40 prior to Nürburgring) were entered at Le Mans but there was no celebration at the end of the race. None of the cars completed 24-hours including two SAI ringers fitted with special transmissions from Kar Kraft and powered by 427 cid engines. Following the disappointment at Le Mans, where Ferrari won for the sixth straight time, SAI and FAV called it quits for the 1965 season and took aim on 1966. A few factory backed cars entered by privateers and others entered by Ford of France saw occasional success during the balance of 1965 but works cars wouldn’t appear on-track again until the following season.
Years 1964 and 1965 would be recognized as the organizational period, the developmental period, and the learning curve prelude to 1966. In 1966, the task of winning Le Mans and embarrassing Ferrari would be assigned to the latest GT40 incarnation called the GT40 MK.II. The MK.II was a structurally stronger car with aerodynamic improvements and above all, the engine bay was designed to mount a modified NASCAR 427 push rod power plant.
Ford wanted eight factory MK.IIs in the ’66 Le Mans race but they decided that no single factory team would be responsible for more than three entries lest their individual facilities and manpower become overtaxed. Therefore, at the beginning of the ’66 season, two more operations were brought on board to augment the SAI effort. Joining SAI would be Holman-Moody (HM) of Charlotte, NC and Alan Mann Racing (AMR) of the UK. HM was the well known NASCAR superpower backed by Ford and AMR fielded for Ford, on the European rally circuit, the successful Rally Falcons and subsequently the equally successful Rally Mustangs.
SAI and HM were to prepare three MK.IIs each in the 427 configuration but in a change of direction, AMR was given the task of developing two “lightweight” MK.IIs. The lightweights were aluminum skinned cars (as opposed to fiber glass) and powered by 289s. They were 290 pounds lighter than the 427 MK.IIs but even though they showed promise at Sebring and in the Le Mans trials, there was insufficient time to fully sort them. As a result, Alan Mann was told to park the lightweights and prepare three 427s to accompany the cars from SAI and HM. Time was short and AMR had no experience with the 427 configuration. So the tubs, although purchased by AMR directly from Abbey Panels, were sent to SAI along with a crew from AMR to assemble the cars in California. It was felt that variability could be minimized by assembling them in the same shop alongside the SAI machines. AMR cars received SAI manufacturer’s plates but since the tubs hadn’t passed through FAV, AMR chassis numbers were assigned using the alpha prefix XGT. Meanwhile, the SAI cars and the HM cars carried P/10xx chassis numbers assigned by FAV.
At Daytona in February 1966, MK.IIs in the 427 configuration from SAI and HM took 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th. At Sebring in March, it was 1st and 2nd. And that was it. Sebring was the last race the works cars would enter before going to Le Mans in June. It was time to prepare them with meticulous care for the most important race of their short career. There was an air of confidence that the MK.IIs would go to Le Mans locked and loaded for victory. Ford fully expected to realize the fruits of outrageous expense and hard work. The plan, of course, was to win the 24-hour race by beating the Ferraris; i.e., to embarrass the organization that had precipitated the GT program in the first place.
At the Sarth circuit in June, SAI cars received entry nos. 1, 2, and 3, HM cars received nos. 4, 5, and 6, and AMR cars received nos. 7 and 8 on two of their three cars. Seven and eight carried AMR chassis numbers XGT-2 and XGT-1, respectively. The third AMR car carried chassis number XGT-3. It was designated as the T-car for the Le Mans event and it’s the same car featured on this month’s cover.
We know that Ford was successful in 1966; they finally accomplished exactly what Henry Ford, II wanted. They met Ferrari on the Le Mans track and they crushed them. In fact, the highest finishing Ferrari, a 275 GTB/C, was in 8th place having not only been outdistanced by the MK.IIs but also by four Porsche 906/6 machines. The only other Ferrari to finish was a 275 GTB in 10th place. Twelve Ferraris dnf’d.
Only three of the eight factory MK.IIs completed the race. SAI no.2 (chassis P/1046), SAI no. 1 (chassis P/1015), and HM no. 5 (chassis no. P/1016) were awarded 1st, 2nd, and 3rd respectively after crossing the finish line three abreast in a Ford orchestrated tie. SAI black and silver car no. 2 was awarded the win even though it had actually been running in 2nd place on the lead lap prior to Ford’s execution of the dead heat. SAI no. 1 had been leading but the artificial finish negated the difference in track position.
Race officials refused to accept the tie and they refused to revert back to the obvious separation in track position just prior to the tie. They chose instead to break the tie by considering total distance traveled. Since Le Mans uses the famous driver sprint standing start, officials focused on the starting grid positions to define the starting point for distance traveled. Compared to car no.1, car no. 2 had started two spaces further back on the grid which meant it traveled a few extra feet over the course of the race. The previously unknown tiebreak formula used those few extra feet to give car no. 2 the winning advantage. HM no. 5 had been running laps down in 3rd place so the tie didn’t affect its finishing order; it placed 3rd. And as noted, the other five MK.IIs were dnf as were five older MK.Is that were not entered as factory cars.
A total of 55 cars started the 1966 race but only 15 finished, such is the difficulty of running at race tempo for 24 hours on the Le Mans circuit. But difficult or not, Ford had taken the top three spots in their third year of trying. To put a resounding exclamation point on their success, they would go on to also win in 1967 by capturing 1st and 2nd. They used the 427 engines again in ’67 but the race cars were built on a Kar Kraft-developed honeycomb tub (J-car chassis) in a configuration known as the MK.IV.
Ford viewed the 1966 accomplishment with such pleasure and (perhaps smug) satisfaction that several MK.IIs were sent on tour to celebrate the victory. All of them were painted black with silver trim and each one carried the identity of car no. 2 in honor of the victory. XGT-3 was one of the those cars. Sometime after the tour ended XGT-3 was returned to its original red color with white trim and identified as no. 3.
Following the tour, XGT-3 was placed in storage in Dearborn, MI where it stayed for several years. In 1977, it was sold to Don Eichstaedt of Detroit, MI who in turn sold it, in March 1978, to Steve Wright of Fayetteville, NC. In May of 1981, Wright sold it to Dale and Pat Nichols of Orlando, FL where it finally began to see track time, albeit in American Historic races. It’s believed that the Nichols family still owns XGT-3 and it’s believed to be for sale. What kind of money do you think it will bring, considering that it’s an unrestored GT 40 MK.II with T-car lineage traceable to the 24 heures du Mans of 1966? The car may not have been raced when it was new but it was at the party in 1966 and it was ready if needed. That in itself makes it a significant part of GT40 history.
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Footnote No. 1
There’s little doubt that the 1966 tie is a legendary part of Ford’s racing history. Ford beat the Ferraris at their own game and staged an unforgettable finish that rubbed salt in Ferrari’s wound. The 3-abreast finish also proved to be a bit of marketing genius in that media coverage of the unusual event showcased Ford’s racing prowess to an otherwise oblivious general public and it did so at the expense of Ferrari. But despite all of that, there was a personal downside for the crew and drivers of SAI no. 1. The car was in position to win and it deserved to win. When the staged finish caused officials to invoke the tiebreak thus relegating no.1 to 2nd place, it was disheartening for the drivers and crew alike. But one person felt it more than the rest.
Ken Miles and Denny Hulme co-drove the no. 1 car and Miles was particularly excited about the car being in 1st place as the race was coming to an end; he was at the wheel, having taken over from Hulme for the final stint. Ford made the decision to stage a tie with some two hours remaining in the race. Assuming neither on-track mishaps nor equipment failures, the cars would finish 3-abreast. All three drivers knew about the plan; they each had instructions on how to proceed.
Everyone was focused on the primary goal of taking a GT40 to victory. No one foresaw the tie as an issue that would affect the order of finish. Car no. 1 was leading so it would be awarded 1st, car no. 2 would get 2nd, and car no. 5 would be 3rd. And Miles who had been so instrumental in the development and sorting of the various GT incarnations would receive his ultimate reward behind the wheel of the winning machine. But it was not to be. With an odd twist of fate, Ken Miles was denied victory because of the artificial finish and because of the previously unknown tiebreak formula. On any other day, 2nd would have been a decent finish but it hurt to be 2nd on this special day, especially in light of the running order just prior to the end.
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Footnote No. 2
As noted, factory GT40s won Le Mans in both 1966 and 1967. GTs won again in 1968 and 1969 giving the marque 4-straight victories but the ‘68/’69 victories did not involve factory cars. Ford made their statement in ‘66 and ’67 so they had no direct participation after that.
In both ‘68 and ‘69, the wins came using chassis P/1075 with 302 power and in the MK.I configuration. With full financial backing from Gulf Oil Co. and support from Ford, P/1075 was entered by J. W. Automotive Engineering (JWA). JWA had acquired FAV on 1-1-67 and renamed the operation.
With John Wyer as CEO, much of the same team that worked on the GT program from the beginning went on to field the winning MK.I machine under the JWA banner. The JWA wins had historical significance because the MK.I configuration was the original incarnation of the race car. It was the configuration that Ford had poor success with during the early years. But finally, the MK.I achieved two victories at Le Mans and with added deference to original design, both victories came using small block power. The loop was finally closed!
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Footnote No. 3
Chassis P/1075 was successful not only at Le Mans but also at six other venues where it won during 1968 and 1969. But what made this particular MK.I so dominant? There was no follow up on that question when this article was originally researched but it came to mind again with the appearance of a multi-page Ford ad in the November 2004 issue of Automobile Magazine. The segment entitled “Road to Domination” gave a thumbnail sketch of Ford GT racing history at Le Mans and other venues from 1964 through 1967. There seemed to be a couple of errors in the 1967 piece so it was back to Spain’s book for clarification. What evolved led directly to P/1075.
The ad reiterated the success of factory MK.IVs in 1967, those cars having been developed by Kar Kraft and prepared by SAI. It went on to state that in addition to the factory MK.IVs, JWA entered non-works GTs in 1967 using a configuration called Mirage. According to the ad, the Mirage was a lightweight version of the MK.IV and it raced only in 1967. That information didn’t seem to ring true so therein lay the need to return to Ronnie Spain’s book. The book, incidentally, is based on 10-years of research, which arguably makes Spain the reigning authority on the Ford GT.
Information in Spain’s book showed two Mirage entries at Le Mans in 1967; both cars were dnf. Furthermore, Spain’s information clearly refuted the claim that 1967 was the only year for the Mirage. In fact, race results for chassis M.10001 (only three Mirages were ever built with M.10001 being one of them) were posted for 1967, 1968, and 1969. It’s true that JWA raced the cars for only one year (1967) but another owner raced M.10001 with fair success for two more years. That seemed to set the record straight on one issue but it could be called trivia compared to the other area of interest.
According to Spain and verified by several photographs in his book, the Mirage was based on the MK.I, not the MK.IV. The MK.IV was built on Kar Kraft’s lightweight (honeycomb) J-series chassis while the Mirage was a lightweight version of the FAV MK I using, among other things, a lightened frame, lightened suspension, and a narrower/lighter greenhouse. With the term “lightweight” applying to both chassis, it was easy to see why there might be some confusion over which “lightweight” resided at the heart of the Mirage. So the errors in the ad were resolved but thanks to their occurrence and the additional research they prompted, chassis P/1075 was suddenly brought front and center.
MK.I chassis P/1075 was actually the rebuild of one of the 1967 Mirage cars, probably chassis M.10003 but maybe chassis M.10002. Spain indicated there was some confusion about which chassis was actually used for P/1075 but there was no confusion on the point of reconfiguring the Mirage back to a MK.I. The car retained the lightened frame, suspension, and roof of the Mirage but it had MK.I body lines including the wide MK.I greenhouse. With all the additional information in hand, the success of P/1075 seemed to stem from its weight advantage coupled with excellent sorting in the MK.I configuration.
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And there you have it, a summary from the convoluted heritage of “the pace car for an entire company.” We wish Ford success as again it tries to invoke some marketing genius by linking the pace car for the future to the legend from the past.